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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM OF
FTC FOR DECISION IN PENDING CASE HELD TO DEPRIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGANT OF DUE PROCESS
In Pillsbury, the Fifth Circuit found a denial of due process be-
cause a Senate Subcommittee, hearing testimony from members
of the Federal Trade Commission, criticized that body for its in-
terpretation of the law applicable to a pending case. While the
fact situation is unique, the holding should have significant rami-
fications for the judicial function of the administrative agencies
generally.
ALTHOUGH the administrative agency1 has become an integral
aspect of American government, 2 its role and the ramifications
thereof have not been fully integrated conceptually. In Pillsbury
Co. v. FTC,3 the Fifth Circuit examined the judicial nature of
one of these bodies and found that due process of law demands that
the judicial function be protected from legislative interference.
After the Pillsbury Company, a nationally-known miller and
producer of flour products, had acquired two competing businesses
in the early fifties, the Federal Trade Commission initiated antitrust
proceedings under section 7 of the Clayton Act, claiming that "the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to cre monopoly."4 In remanding the case to the
hearing examiner, who had previously dismissed it for lack of evi-
dence, the full Commission held that a prima facie case had been
established.5 However, the Commission rejected the Government's
contention that the acquisitions constituted a per se violation of
2 See generally DAvis, ADMINmRAvIVE LAW TREATisE (1958); Clark, Administrative
Justice, 1960, 13 AD. L. REV. 6 (1960); Fuchs, Fairness and Effectiveness in Administra-
tive Agency Organization and Procedures, 36 IND. L.J. 1 (1960); Massel, The Regula-
tory Process, 26 LAw & CONTEMI. PROB. 181 (1961); Stone, The Twentieth Century
Administrative Explosion and After, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 513 (1964).
2 "They [administrative bodies] have become a veritable fourth branch of the
Government, which has deranged our three-branch [sic] legal theories much as the
concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking." FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
'Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953).
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section 7. A mere showing that the merged companies "together
control a substantial amount of sales, or that a substantial portion
of commerce is affected" was in itself insufficient to establish the
prohibited tendency to lessen competition; other factors were also
essential to that determination7 That opinion, as the first decision
of the Commission under the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger amend-
ment,8 indicated the approach that would be taken in subsequent
section 7 cases.9
A year and a half later, while Pillsbury was still presenting evi-
dence to the examiner, hearings concerning antitrust matters gen-
erally were held in both the House and the Senate.'0 The chair-
man of the FTC, Mr. Edward F. Howrey, was asked to appear before
these subcommittees to discuss mergers." Accompanying him were
Old. at 564.
7 "As we see it, amended Section 7 sought to reach the mergers embraced within
its sphere in their incipiency, and to determine their legality by tests of its own.
These are not the rule of reason of the Sherman Act, that is, unreasonable restraint
of trade, nor are Section 7 prohibitions to be added to the list of per se violations.
Somewhere in between is Section 7, which prohibits acts that 'may' happen in a par-
ticular market, that looks to 'a reasonable probability,' to 'substantial' economic
consequences, to acts that 'tend' to a result." Id. at 569.
The Commission, in finding a prima facie case, did not rely solely upon the
market position which Pillsbury had attained by these acquisitions. It was per-
suaded also by the general condition of the market, which essentially was one of
declining competition, dominated by a few big companies, which had achieved their
pre-eminence through mergers. In addition, the Commission took into account the
lack of new entries into the market. Id. at 572.
The per se test which the Commission here rejected was developed under § 3
of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). See, e.g.,
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Under this test a mere showing that a substantial market
had been foreclosed from competition was sufficient to allow the court to grant the
appropriate relief. The Government was not further required to show an actual
lessening of competition.
8 Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
0 The per se test which Pillsbury rejected has not been applied in § 7 cases.
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Handler & Robinson, A
Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
629 (1961).
10 See generally Hearings to Study the Antitrust Laws of the United States, and their
Administration, Interpretation, and Effect Pursuant to S. Res. 61 Before the Sub-
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Hearings Before
the Antitrust Subcommittee (Subcommittee No. 5) of the House Committee of the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3 (1955) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
The publication of the AT-r'Y GEN. NAT'L CoM. ANTITRUsr REP. (1955) appears to




other commissioners and staff members including Mr. Secrest and
Mr. Kintner, both of whom were on the Commission in 1960.12
Some of the congressmen expressed displeasure with the tests the
Commission was using in merger cases brought under section 7 of
the Clayton Act. They feared that the FTC was adopting the
rule of reason test developed under the Sherman Act. 13 In this
context the current Pillsbury case was repeatedly used as a pertinent
example, by both FTC Chairman Howrey and the committee mem-
bers.14 It soon became very clear that certain members of the Con-
gress believed that the Commission had deviated from congressional
intent by rejecting the per se test, and that the Pillsbury acquisition
was a perfect example of the type of merger prohibited by law.15
12 Present at these hearings with Chairman Howrey were two other commis-
sioners, John W. Gwynne and Robert T. Secrest, as well as certain staff members,
including Earl W. Kintner, then Chief Counsel but later Chairman of the Commission
and author of the 1960 Pillsbury opinion. Also present was Joseph Sheehy, the
Director of the Bureau of Litigation, whose assistant was William Kern, a commis-
sioner in 1960. Thus two of the 1960 commissioners were present at the 1955 hear-
ings and a third commissioner was indirectly exposed to the hearings. See 354 F.2d at
956; Senate Hearings at 132.
18"Senator KEFAUVER. I just want to say, as one who has been very much in-
terested in this, Mr. HoWREY ... that I have been rather shocked and surprised with
the turn that has been given to the amendment to the Clayton Act, having lived
with it since the early 1940's.
"It was never the intention of the Judiciary Committee of the House-and I am
certain that the same was true over here-that the new amendment to section 7 of the
Clayton Act should be enforced, as you have enforced it, on the basis of Sherman
Act tests. It was intended that it was to be enforced on the basis of what the
Congress had said about section 3 and the other sections of the Clayton Act.
"Here, I cannot be sure, but it seems that you are applying no different treatment
to section 7 of the. Clayton Act than has always been applied to Sherman Act cases.
That was just not the intent of many of us who were interested in this legislation."
Id. at 160.
1'4 Chairman Howrey first interjected the Pillsbury decision into the hearings, id.
at 97, by observing that its approach had been favorably approved by the Attorney
General's report, ATr'Y GFN. NAT'L Com,,. ANiTRUswr REP. 120-24 (1955). Mr. How-
rey's purpose was apparently to show why the per se test was inappropriate to such
cases. He again referred to the case in describing the standards that would be used
by the FTC in merger litigation. Senate Hearings 124-27. Before the House Sub-
committee the Pillsbury case was likewise discussed in connection with the per se
test. See House Hearings 2310-11, 2356-57, 2443-53.
15Senator Kefauver and Chairman Howrey discussed at some length the ex-
tensive durations of antimerger cases. The senator argued that the per se test would
shorten them. Mr. Howrey, of course, disagreed. Senate Hearings 139-40. The
following remarks are typical:
"Senator KEFAuvER. . . . I think Congress expected that where there was mani-
festly a lessening of competition, under the amended Clayton Act a merger should
not take *place.
"Now, here in the Southeast, a section of the country, there is a lessening of com-
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Chairman Howrey belatedly objected to this discussion of a pending
case and told the committee that he would consequently disqualify
himself from further participation in its consideration.'8
The hearing examiner continued to receive evidence for nearly
five years before the case again came before the Commission.
Then in 1960, affirming the decision of the hearing examiner, the
Commission ordered Pillsbury to divest itself of the two acquisi-
tions.'1 In the instant decision in 1966, the Fifth Circuit reversed
that holding. The court found that the penetrating discussion of the
Pillsbury case which occurred before the Senate Subcommittee con-
stituted an intrusion by the legislature into the judicial function
of the Commission and that Pillsbury had therefore been denied due
process of law.'8 It stressed that there must be a fair hearing and
moreover that there must be an "appearance of impartiality."'1
petition because one firm had 20 and something percent, and the other had 20 and
something percent.
"It would seem to me by applying the rule of reason and running the record up
to 9,000 pages with more to come, and bringing in every possible economic factor,
this, that, and the other, that the Federal Trade Commission is rather taking over
the prerogative of congressional intent." Id. at 140.
In the House, Representative Celler not only reiterated the concern about the
time spent in merger cases, but he also made quite clear his opinion that the per se
test alone accorded with the congressional intent. House Hearings 2443-44.
'1 "Mr. HowREY. Well, I think the question you are asking about the Pillsbury
decision is a much greater challenge to judicial processes, because I am sitting as a
quasi-judicial officer in that case. That is a much greater challenge to judicial
processes than anything I did by participating in this committee of the Attorney
General.
"Senator KEFAUVER. Maybe you should not have answered my questions.
"Mr. HowREY. I think I will disqualify myself in the Pillsbury case for the rest
of the case because of the inquiry which you have made about my mental processes
in it.
"But let me answer your other question, and I think I should because I do not
think I can sit in a quasi-judicial capacity and-I think you have delved too deeply
into the quasi-judicial mind in the Pillsbury matter." Senate Hearings 161. See
House Hearings 2445.
17 Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960), rev'd, 254 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
The Commission clearly did not use a per se approach in rendering its decision.
See 57 F.T.C. at 1398-99 & n.71.
13 It is significant to note that in reversing the FTC decision, the court did not
assert that the Commission had improperly conducted itself; rather, the court was
concerned solely with the congressional interference. "We conclude that the pro-
ceedings [the hearings] . . . constituted an improper intrusion into the adjudicatory
processes of the Commission and were of such a damaging character as to have
required at least some of the members in addition to the Chairman to disqualify
themselves." 354 F.2d at 963. Thus the court believed that not only Chairman
Howrey but other commissioners as well were affected by the probing questions at
the hearings. Ibid.
19 1d. at 964.
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In remanding the case to the Commission, the court intimated that
the present commissioners would be sufficiently insulated from the
effects of the 1955 hearings such that they could properly dispose of
the case.2
0
The court in Pillsbury did not attempt to show in what manner
Pillsbury had been injured. Most likely, it was not injured at all,
for even as the Commission interpreted the law it seemed clear that
the acquisitions were contrary to section 7.21 Likewise, the court
reached its decision without fully explaining why there was a lack
of due process in the proceedings of the Commission. Nonetheless,
there are two planes upon which the court's rationale can be ex-
amined.
First to be considered is the nature of the procedural guarantees
that must be afforded by an administrative body functioning in a
judicial capacity. Second is the nature of the relationship between
the Congress and the administrative body which adjudicates claims
between public and private interests. The court apparently assumed
that the agency must afford the same protections extended by a
court and further that the agency, at least when pursuing its judicial
role, exists independently of the legislature, in the same manner
as does a court. Under either assumption the interest to be pro-
tected in Pillsbury is the same: trial before an impartial judge.
-0 The manner in which the presently constituted Commission is to handle the
case is not at all dear. Presumably, it is to undertake a re-examination of the record
as created before the hearing examiner. See id. at 965. In assuming that the Com-
mission in 1966 was insulated from the effects of the hearing, the court stressed that
there had been a change in personnel and further that the law interpreting § 7
had been solidified. Ibid. See note 9 supra.
It is true that there has developed in the law a "mental processes" rule which
forbids a reviewing court to delve into the administrator's decision-making tech-
nique. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941); United States v. Morgan,
313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 163 F.2d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 867 (1948); Walled Lake Door Co. v. United States, 31
F.R.D. 258, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1962); cf. Fayerweather v. Pitch, 195 U.S. 276 (1904).
See also Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964). However, the applicability of this rule to Pillsbury seems
inappropriate, for it has not been invoked whenever any improper influence has
been revealed. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955);
Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 206-08 (4th Cir. 1964).
21See Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960), rev'd, 254 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.
1966). As the Commission refused to apply a per se test when it again considered
the case in 1960, there is no indication that the congressional scolding had its in-
tended effect. See note 16 supra. It can be argued that even though the per se test
was not used, the Commission was still pressured to find against Pillsbury. However,
the Commission's determination in 1953 that a prima fade case had been estab-
lished, see text accompanying note 5 supra, would seem to vitiate that contention.
Vol. 1966: 779]
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The regulatory body serves a conglomerate function. It ad-
ministers the law, establishes regulations pursuant to the law, and
decides cases arising under the statutes or its rules, thereby com-
bining executive, legislative and judicial responsibilities. The chief
purpose and advantage of this structure is that a body of experts
is entrusted with the application of statutes relating to complex
areas of governmental regulation.
2 2
While agencies have legislative and executive functions, the
concern in Pillsbury is only with the judicial function and the pro-
cedural due process it demands.23 The procedures of a particular
administrative body are initially regulated by the creating statute,
24
the Administrative Procedure Act,25 and the rules of procedure of
the agency.26 The legislation, however, seems only to require a
separation of the investigative and the adjudicative functions within
the particular agency.27 The rules of practice for the Federal Trade
2 1 There is not absolute agreement on the proper role of these bodies. The most
recent focal point of controversy has been whether the judicial function of the
agencies should be retained. At the same time there is an emphasis upon increasing
the utility of the agencies. See generally 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRAIvE LAW TREATzsE
§ 1.04 (Supp. 1965); FRIENDLY, TnE AD lNinmATIvE AGENCIFS (1962); Auerbach, Some
Thoughts on the Hector Memorandum, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 183; Cary, Why I Oppose
the Divorce of the Judicial Function from Federal Regulatory Agencies, 51 A.BA.J.
33 (1965); Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger
Law, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 385 (1964); Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent
Regulatory Commission, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960); Kintner, The Current Ordeal of
the Administrative Process: In Reply to Mr. Hector, 69 YAL L.J. 965 (1960); Shapiro,
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. Rav. 921 (1965).
' The nature of the administrative action undertaken determines the procedural
rights guaranteed the litigant. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 (1960). Thus, a
hearing carried out merely to amass information preparatory to the promulgation
of rules or the recommendation of legislation may not require confrontation of wit-
nesses. See id. at 440-52; cf. Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 609 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d
676, 694 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949). However, a hearing which is
part of an adjudicatory proceeding would apparently demand that this safeguard be
afforded. See Hannah v. Larche, supra at 442; cf. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1,
18-21 (1938). But cf. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
894-95 (1961); Bradford v. School District No. 20, 244 F. Supp. 768, 772 (E.D.S.C.
1965).
"' Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
-41-58 (1964). The essential procedural aspects of the act are contained in 38 Stat.
719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
"'60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
" Procedure, Rules of Practice, and Orders of Federal Trade Commission, 16
C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.134; 2.1-.41; 3.1-.30 (1960, Supp. 1965).




Commission are only slightly more explicit by forbidding ex parte
communications with a decision maker.28
The courts, in refining the procedural guarantees an administra-
tive body must afford in its judicial role, have relied upon the due
process concept but have allowed the administrative agencies to
adopt lesser standards than those required of the courts.29 They
have not required a " 'wholesale transplantation of the rules of pro-
cedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history and
experience of the courts.'-30 Although no clear guidelines as to
procedural due process have been developed by the cases, there is a
pervasive emphasis at least upon the general notion of fairness and
more particularly upon the appearance of such fairness.31
The assumed threat to such fairness in Pillsbury was that the
questions asked by the hearings and the pungent criticism of the
Commission's interpretation of section 7 would predispose the Com-
missioners to reach a result adverse to Pillsbury. For administrative
litigants, protection against such influence is meager. While the
FTC rules prohibit ex parte contacts, they provide no remedy for
the potentially resulting harm.32 Further, an administrative litigant
28 16 C.F.R. § 4.5 (Supp. 1965). This provision was made more explicit in 1963.
28 Fed. Reg. 7092 (1963). Still, however, there is no provision for disqualification;
ex parte communications are simply forbidden and required to be reported. See
generally Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. FCC, 358 U.S. 49 (1958); Colon, Court
and the Commissioner: Ex Parte Contacts and the Sangamon Valley Case, 19 FED.
Com. B.J. 67 (1964-1965); Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications
with Administrative Agencies, 76 HARv. L. REV. 233 (1962).
2' See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948) (agencies are not
bound by common law rules of evidence); Lambros v. Young, 145 F.2d 341, 343 (D.C.
Cir. 1944) (more informal procedure); United States v. Rasmussen, 222 F. Supp. 430,
438 (D. Mont. 1963) (evidence need not be presented before defendant). See gen-
erally I DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREA sE § 8.03 (1958).
'
0 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 253 (1944), quoting FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940).
31 "[Ain administrative hearing . . . must be attended, not only with every ele-
ment of fairness but with the very appearance of complete fairness." Amos Treat
& Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1962), 76 HARv. L. REv. 831 (1963). See
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964).
Perhaps In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), best illustrates the meaning of such
a standard. There the judge who heard the contempt proceedings which arose out
of a grand jury investigation was also the sole member of the "one-man grand jury"
which had issued the contempt citation. The Court, holding that such a procedure
violated due process, noted that "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness." Id. at 136. Cf. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11
(1954).
"See note 28 supra. However, in Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United
States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the court held that ex parte contacts between
the Commissioners and one interested in the assignment of a television channel
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can seldom successfully assert a violation of due process merely
because a member of a commission had in the past adversely com-
mented on the activity presently subject to review.8 3 The related
question of the personal bias of the decision maker is confounded
by the lack of a statutory disqualification device.8 4 Consequently,
in several cases a rule of necessity has been applied allowing the
allegedly biased personnel to decide the dispute since no other body
is competent to do so.35
As the protection afforded against outside influence upon the
decision making process of an administrative judge is minimal, a
rationalization of Pillsbury under such an analysis falters. While
the congressional investigation here may be likened to an ex parte
vitiated the determination of the FCC, thus requiring a reopening of the proceed-
ing. See generally Peck, supra note 28.
"See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702-03 (1948) (prior report to
Congress that basing point system was unfair); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,
421-22 (1941) (public criticism of court decision pertinent to case); Gilligan, Will &
Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959), 45 VA. L.
Rmv. 1053 (prior press release that conduct subsequently at issue violated law);
National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 126 F. Supp. 730, 733 (D.D.C. 1954) (public
statement of intent to register Guild as Communist front); Montana Power Co.-v.
Public Service Commn, 12 F. Supp. 946, 948-49 (D. Mont. 1935) (campaign promise
to take action here at issue). Contra, Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 759-60 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965) (speech prior
to appointment to commission); cf. United States ex Yet. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260 (1954), in which the Court held that a potential deportee could assert
that the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals had been dictated by the At-
torney General, inasmuch as there had been circulated among the Board a statement
by the Attorney General that the relator was an "unsavory character" and should be
deported. Id. at 264. The Court noted that while the Board was subordinate to the
Attorney General, it was nonetheless required to exercise its own discretion in
cases before it. Id. at 266-67. See generally Comment, 13 VAND. L. Rav. 712, 720-22
(1960).
34 In the federal district courts, litigants can by filing the proper affidavit recuse
and have removed judges with a personal bias in the case. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1964).
See generally Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1920); Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185
F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951); Eisler v. United States,
170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949); United States v.
Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Pa. 1958); Note, Disqualification of Judges for
Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1453 (1966). In Texaco, Inc. v. FTC,
336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 381 U.S.
739 (1965), the court held that Texaco was denied due process in an administrative
hearing because Commissioner Dixon, who bad publicly attacked the practice in
issue, had participated in the decision. Id. at 760. The case indicates that even
without a statutory disqualification device, a decision maker can be forced to recuse
himself.
15E.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948); Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd. v. Long Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 295 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1961);
Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 12 F. Supp. 946, 949 (D. Mont. 1935).
But cf. Texaco, -Inc. v. FTC, supra note 34.
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contact, beyond disclosure there is no remedy provided for that
threat to an impartial hearing. Further, there appears to have been
no claim of bias in the instant case. Even if the argument had been
presented, the rule of necessity would probably have been applied.
Finally, while the facts may substantiate the evil inherent in prior
comment and expression of opinion, there appears to be no relief
from that possible harm.
The court, however, did not make any examination of the pro-
cedural guarantees owed to a party in Pillsbury's position. It con-
sidered instead the isolation of the administrative agency from the
Congress and sought "to preserve the integrity of the judicial aspect
of the administrative process."86 It is curious that the Pillsbury
court was extremely concerned with the mere possibility of harm
while other courts have easily discounted actual injury created by
influence on administrative judges. This inconsistency suggests that
the thrust of this opinion goes to the nature of the administrative
body rather than to the protections that such a body must afford.
The administrative agencies are creatures of Congress. The
ramifications of that origin, however, are uncertain. The ability of
the legislature to probe into the judicial operations of an admin-
istrative body has been examined only cursorily by the commen-
tators87 and not approached by the courts directly until Pillsbury.
Congress surely has a legitimate interest in determining whether
the laws it passes are appropriately executed by these regulatory
bodies. Accordingly, there have been established both special
watchdog committees38 and oversight duties in existing committees.39
16 354 F.2d at 964.
7 See generally REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCtES TO Tm P msIENT-ELECr, 86TH
CONG., 2D Sass. 33-34 (Comm. Print 1960); CoMMrrrEE ON ORGANIZATION OF THE Ex-
Fc iTv BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, TASK FORC REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
app. N (1949) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; Broden, Legislative and
Executive Oversight of the Administrative Process, 26 ICC PRAc. J. 768 (1959); Com-
mittee on Administrative Law, Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies,
5 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 11 (1950); Hall, Responsibility of President and Congress for
Regulatory Policy Development, 26 LAw & CONTmP. PROB. 261, 278-80 (1961); Heady
& Linenthal, Congress and Administrative Regulation, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 238
(1961); Legislature-Agency Disagreements Concerning the Construction of Regulatory
Statutes, 36 A.B.A.J. 859 (1950); Melville, Legislative Control Over Administrative
Rule Making, 32 U. CINC. L. Rlv. 33 (1963); Newman & Keaton, Congress and the
Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 Cu"I,
L. REv. 565 (1953).
as E.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 15, 60 Stat. 772 .(amended by 68
Stat. 956 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2251-57 (1964)); Labor Management Relations Act
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By these devices the lawmakers may keep informed as to the ade-
quacy of existing laws, the need for amendments, and the quality
of the body which it has created to administer the laws in question.
However, when these committees, or Congress itself, seek not only
information but a control over the decision making pattern of the
agency, then the regulatory body would seem to be little more than
an arm of the particular congressional committee.40 Such a result,
however, seems fully inconsistent with congressional intent and con-
stitutional requirements.41
In creating and developing the administrative instrument, in this
instance the FTC, Congress established a new and separate body
which would have broad discretion in executing the duties dele-
gated to it.42 Subsequent enactments such as the Administrative
§§ 401-07, 61 Stat. 160 (1947). See generally Melville, supra note 37, at 37; "Watchdog
Committees" in the 80th Congress, 34 A.B.A.J. 726 (1948).
3 9 
"To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each
standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise
continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned
of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee;
and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the
Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government." Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, § 1356, 60 Stat. 832, 2 U.S.C. § 190d (1964).
"This dichotomy of function was disputed with reference to the Pillsbury case:
"Mr. KEATING. I do not think this committee has got any business telling the
Federal Trade Commission how to run their shop or how they should conduct their
lawsuit or prepare their cases for trial. I think it is going way wide of the mark
of anything I thought we were set up to do.
"The CHAMMAN. I do not agree with the gentleman. I think we have a right to
know how our act is being carried out." House Hearings 2453.
"[G]iven no impropriety, the rationality of their [regulatory agencies] decisions
or their attitude towards the handling of pending causes, even though some of them
may not yet have reached the adjudicatory stage, should not be subject to inquiry.
Their independence in this respect should be as much respected as that of the
judges." REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES, op. cit. supra note 37, at 34.
"It is clear that legislative committees ought not suggest how the agency should
decide particular cases or issues pending in those cases-any more than the legis-
lature would presume to suggest to a court that it should decide a particular case for
the plaintiff or defendant." Committee on Administrative Law, supra note 37, at 15.
Cf. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
4
1 See note 44 infra.
" While the FTC may have originally been conceived as little more than an
auxiliary to the Justice Department and as an expert advisor to the Congress, it was
nonetheless to be an "independent" body like the ICC capable of being given more
power at a later time. See S. REp. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-12 (1914). "Such
work [building up a body of administrative law] must be done by a board or com-
mission of dignity, permanence, and ability, independent of executive authority, ex-
cept in its selection, and independent in character." Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 98
Before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1911).
See generally Daish, The Federal Trade Commission, 24 YALE L.J. 43 (1914). The
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Procedure Act reinforce the view that the administrative agencies
are more than appendages of Congress. 43 Further, the nature of the
legislative process argues against a contrary notion. The Congress
has authorized a judicial function in the agency; yet, if it dictates
the decisions of that agency, the legislature itself is exercising a
judicial function. 44 Aside from all these objections to the dilution of
the independent judicial power in the agencies is the simple obser-
vation that it is not necessary, for if Congress dislikes the interpre-
tation that is being given to a particular statute, it can amend the
law rather than subvert the independence of the agency.
By preserving the independence of the FTC's judicial function,
Pillsbury accomplishes two results. It militates against the danger of
a determination of the disputed issue by a few members of a con-
gressional committee who have not heard all the evidence and who
are predisposed to one result. Moreover, Pillsbury forbids Congress
to give an interpretation of the law applicable to a suit after it has
been commenced.45 Although the rationale which produces these
power of the FTC was increased in 1938. See Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52
Stat. 111.
The regulatory commissions are generally referred to as "independent" which seems
intended to connote that the personnel are beyond the removal power of the presi-
dent. See JAF E, JuDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINiSrRAiVE ACTION 3, 21 (1965); TASK
FORCE REPORT 12, 14.
12Implicit in the recommendation for legislation to regulate the procedures of
the administrative agencies was the realization that these bodies were largely free
to pursue their own methods of operation. See H.R. RE. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7-18 (1946). "The purpose of the bill is to assure that the administration of
government through administrative officers and agencies shall be conducted according
to established and published procedures which adequately protect the private
interests involved, the making of only reasonable and authorized regulations, the
settlement of disputes in accordance with the law and the evidence, the impartial
conferring of authorized benefits or privileges, and the effectuation of the declared
policies of Congress in full." Id. at 18.
41 The exercise of the judicial function by the legislature is proscribed by the
theory of separation of powers as incorporated in the Constitution. See Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1880); cf. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516,
530-34 (1933); J. W. Hampton, Jr. g- Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406-07 (1928).
See generally THE FEDERALISr Nos. 47-48 (Madison), 81 (Hamilton). "There is al-
ways the temptation in this system for members of the staff or of the committee to
intrude into the actual administration of the statute and to attempt to influence
specific policies or decisions of the commission through informal suggestion. Any such
development would appear inconsistent with the traditional separation of powers and
would tend toward less responsibility instead of more." TASK FoRcE REPORT 37.
45In People ex rel. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 16 N.Y. 424
(1857), the legislature, after the suit had been commenced, passed an act declaring
what it deemed the proper construction of the statute applicable in the litigation.
The court held that it was not bound by the subsequent legislation and noted that
"the legislature has no judicial power, and cannot upon any pretense interpose its
Vol. 1966: 779]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
results is obscure, the court has suggested a standard which may give
some insighi into the precedential quality of the decision: "[W]e
become concerned with the right of private litigants to a fair trial
and, equally important, with their right to the appearance of im-
partiality . "..."46
Such a standard, which has been alluded to in previous dicta, 41
accomplishes two objectives. It allows the court to reverse the de-
cision of an administrative body in circumstances where, although
the court cannot isolate a specific manifestation of prejudice, there
is a substantial likelihood of its existence. Additionally, by con-
centrating upon appearance and not merely effects, this test, when
used as a guide post by the agency or congressional committee,
should constitute a preventive force against practices potentially
prejudicial to parties to administrative proceedings. For this purpose
it does not serve as well as would a more absolute rule which could
fully proscribe certain conduct. Nonetheless, even if the committee
members and the commissioners are unable to determine the re-
quirements of the rule in a particular factual situation, they will at
least be conscious that a standard does exist.48 They therefore hope-
fully may be less disposed to pursue harmful dialogue.
While Pillsbury appears to be founded on this appearance test
more than upon any other basis, the use of that standard reflects
the court's concept of an independent judicial role for the admin-
authority respecting questions of interpretation pending in the courts." Id. at 432.
Accord, Personal Finance Co. v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 779 (D. Del. 1949).
A change in the understanding of the constitution may often be retroactive. Com-
pare United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 998 (1964), with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See also Bender,
The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962). See generally Note, 41 NoTRE DAME LAw. 206 (1965).
A change in statutory law, however, is generally only prospective. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Clark, 176 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1949). But cf. Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining
Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). Of course, changes in criminal law detrimental to an ac-
cused or one convicted are forbidden by the prohibition on ex post facto laws. U.S.
CONST. art. 1, §§ 9-10; see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). However,
changes in the criminal law of a beneficial nature are generally available to the ac-
cused and the convicted. See 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1183, 1336 & nn. 13-14 (1959). But cf.
Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1265, 1290 (1964).
6 854 F.2d at 964. (Emphasis added.)
'7 See Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 806 F. 2d 260, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1962), 76 HARV. L.
REv. 881 (1963); cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 13, 136 (1955); Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954); Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35-36 (1921); Whitaker
v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (per curiam).
r8 t was apparent even at the Senate hearings that Chairman Howrey felt that
he had acted prejudiaially to Pillsbury. Senator Kefauver was equally conscious of
the impropriety. See note 16 supra.
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istrative agency. However, that assumption as embodied in the ap-
pearance test does not accord with the general line of authority
exempting administrative bodies from rigorous due process limita-
tions. Consequently, the case stands alone. Future litigation con-
cerning the impartiality of an administrative panel will be con-
fronted by the result and the broad test of Pillsbury. The unique
character of the fact situation and the sweep of the appearance test
Pillsbury espouses may, however, provide ready handles to distin-
guish it.
